only under very restricted conditions. However, in the process of reviewing this research, several important conceptual problems have been identified. Testing has focused on static rather than dynamic manifestations of conflict. Fragmentary indicators have been used to assess conflict at both levels of political interaction, and measurement is further complicated by the question of cross-national validity. In addition, the role of the state and environmental constraints on projection are in need of further exploration. It is recommended that all of these factors be considered in any new model of the conflict nexus that is intended for empirical testing.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR CONFLICT AND COHESION
Freud hypothesized that an individual might cope with internal conflict by projecting it outward. Perhaps a nation-state in turmoil could be expected to react in much the same way (Freud 1949) . Sometimes referred to as &dquo;externalization&dquo; or &dquo;projection&dquo;, the notion that leaders will engage in foreign conflict in order to promote domestic cohesion was popularized initially by sociologists (Coser 1956. Reuck and Knight 1966; Kluckhohn 1960; Simmel 1955; and Sherif and Sherif 1955) . According to sociological theory, an elite faced with social disintegration might attempt to restore order by diverting the public eye toward an external menace. Domestic strife then is expected to subside, because those within the group will put aside their differences (at least temporarily) in order to pursue the higher goal of national preservation. Similarly, Haas and Whiting argued that elites would try to preserve their power in the face of domestic threats by uniting their followers against external danger. They predicted that would occur in &dquo;periods of rapid industrialization and large-scale social change&dquo; (Haas and 22 Whiting 1956:62). At an equally general level, from his analysis of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Rosecrance concluded that &dquo;there tends to be a correlation between international instability and the domestic insecurity of elites&dquo;. He thus conceived of domestic tranquility as a &dquo;vehicle of international stability and external peace&dquo; (Rosecrance 1963:304, 306) .
From the outset, the theory of conflict linkage found a receptive audience among those concerned with explaining international conflict. It provided a plausible explanation for aggressive actions which could not be traced to outstanding grievances at the international level. The theory also had the potential to be tested in a straightforward manner. Two decades ago, the interest in conflict and cohesion crystallized in the form of a sustained effort to obtain confirmation through aggregate research. This research program will be described and appraised in some detail. (Rummel 1963) . Soon afterward, Tanter used data from other years to replicate these findings, although the introduction of a time-lag in his study did produce a minor level of association between internal and external conflict (Tanter 1966 (Hazlewood 1975:227 (Hazlewood 1975:238 (Wilkenfeld 1975 (Collins 1973 (Rummel 1963:21) . But is it likely that such theories will be discovered through an approach that almost completely eschews deductive reasoning? An effort to correlate dimensions of conflict across the domestic levels is misplaced without some convincing reasons about why they should be connected to each other in the first place.
Consider the breadth and depth of external conflict that might be necessary for a regime to obtain renewed support from its citizens. Among others, Barbera has referred to the &dquo;sustained massive impact&dquo; of war on the nation-state, with the changes involved having dramatic implications for the domestic political process. In time of war, governments as a rule are able to achieve greater centralization of power. A regime at war also can expect higher levels of cooperation and conformity from its population, at least initially (Barbera 1973:34 (Stohl 1980:328 (Zinnes 1980 Wright (1965 Wright ( :1016 . See also Huntington (1962) and Lasswell (1965) .
2 Wilkenfeld (1968 Wilkenfeld ( , 1969 and Zinnes and Wilkenfeld (1971) . Other Markov studies are those of Wilkenfeld (1972) and Wilkenfeld and Zinnes (1973) .
3 Some examples include Bueno de Mesquita (1980) , Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971) , Mack (1975) , Rummel (1969) , Scolnick (1974) , Starr (1974) , Stein (1976) , Stohl (1980) , and Zinnes (1975 and Zinnes ( , 1980 . 4 There is one scientific study which, at least partially, is exempt from the preceding criticism. Zinnes and Wilkenfeld (1971) (Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young 1971) . In the latter case, restoration of domestic order would be the principal benefit. Secondly, when the strategies fail, the benefits will be unequal, too. The "benefits" from failure under strategy F might include destruction of the government itself, as opposed to continued existence of the elite in some form under failure of strategy D. 6 For but three such examples, consult Stohl (1980) , Mack (1975) and Scolnick (1974) . 7 Crisis-based testing of conflict and cohesion will appear in James (1987) .
